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REFLECTIONS ON THE SUPREME COURT'S
1988 TERM: THE EMPLOYMENT
DISCRIMINATION DECISIONS AND THE
ABANDONMENT OF THE SECOND
RECONSTRUCTION'*
MARK S. BROWN**
I. INTRODUCTION
July 2, 1989, was the 25th anniversary of the enactment of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964, 1 passed in the wake of the assassination of
President John F. Kennedy. Congress designed Title V11 2 of that
landmark legislation to eliminate discrimination from the American
workplace," and it placed the considerable power of federal law and
the federal courts behind the demand for equal employment op-
portunity in the private as well as public sector.`
Guiding this law through the 88th Congress was no mean po-
litical feat. The New York Times recently published a photograph of
	t Copyright	 1990 Mark S. Brodin.
* This article is based On a presentation the author made to a Federal Judicial Center
Seminar for United States Magistrates held in Boston, Massachusetts in July, 1989.
** Associate Professor, Boston College Law School. B.A. 1969, J.D. 1972, Columbia
University.
1
 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000a-200011(6) (1982).
	
42 U.S.C.
	 2000e—e-17 (1982).
REP. No. 914, 88th Cong„ 1st Sess. 18, 26 (1963). See generally Vaas, Title VII:
Legislative History, 7 B.C. INb. & Com. L. REV. 431 (1966).
.4
 The law was amended in 1972 to cover governmental as well as private employers. See
Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-261, § 2, 86 Stat. 103 (1972).
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the ceremony in which President Lyndon Johnson signed the Civil
Rights Act. 5 Seated in the first row in the photograph are Senators
Everett Dirkson and Hubert Humphrey, together with Congress-
men Charles Halleck and Emanuel Geller. How was agreement
possible among persons of such conflicting political philosophies on
a matter as controversial as Title VII?
Part of the explanation may be found in the vague nature of
the statute's language. It prohibits "discrimination" in employment
opportunities "because of" an individual's race, color, religion, sex,
or national origin.6 The legislation does not provide a definition of
"discrimination." It does not specify how discrimination is to be
proven or disproven in court. It does not disclose what "because
of" actually means in practice — whether the impermissible reason
must be the sole reason for the challenged employment decision, or
merely one of the reasons behind it. The statute fails to address the
question of the extent of a court's power to remedy discrimination
by ordering racial (or other) preferences, or whether an employer
can establish such preferences voluntarily without running afoul of
the law. Rather, these fundamental questions, and numerous others,
were left to the courts to answer. Title VII may thus aptly be
described as "judicial legislation." Legislators with diametrically dif-
ferent views on these questions could still join together in 1964 in
support of the proposed law.
Over the past 25 years, the federal courts have been busy
defining the scope and content of Title VII. They have developed
the two basic theories of discrimination that we now call disparate
treatment and disparate impact.' They have devised the schemes of
proof in which inferences of discrimination may be raised by certain
sequences of events,8 and by statistics. 9 The courts have drawn the
6 N.Y. Times, Jul. 2, 1989, at 16.
6 42 U.S.G. § 2000e-2 (1982). The operative text provides:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer—(1) to fail or
refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against
any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges
of employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin; (2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for em-
ployment in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of
employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an em-
ployee, because of such individual's race, color, religions, sex, or national origin.
See International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335 n.15 (1977).
8 See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
9 See Hazelwood School Dist. v. United States, 433 U.S. 299 (1977); International Bhd.
of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324 (1977).
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contours of appropriate relief, including affirmative or group rem-
edies (both court-ordered and voluntary) that are designed not to
compensate actual victims but rather to dismantle patterns of dis-
criminatory practices. 10
Over those 25 years, the Justices on the Supreme Court had
reached a reasonably reliable consensus as to the direction in which
Title VII should proceed. That consensus broke down last Term,
and we have witnessed a fundamental change in the Court's inter-
pretation of Title VII (as well as other civil rights legislation) and
its attitude toward the persisting problem of discrimination in our
society. While the Bush Administration would have us believe that
these are only "technical" changes," an exploration of the decisions
reveals otherwise.
II. THE DEFINITION OF "DISCRIMINATION" AND THE STANDARDS OF
PROOF UNDER TITLE VII
A. Disparate Treatment
Since the Court's 1971 decision in Griggs v. Duke Power Co.,' 2
authored by Chief Justice Warfen Burger, "discrimination" within
the context of Title VII has had two meanings: disparate treatment
and disparate impact. Disparate treatment is the familiar form of
intentional, deliberate conduct motivated by bias against the em-
ployee, such as the refusal to promote a woman because she is a
woman. Proof of discriminatory motive is essential to the plaintiff's
case. A plaintiff may prove motive by either direct evidence, such
as an admission by a manager that females are not considered for
promotion in the firm, or indirect circumstantial pi-6(JF, such as
demonstrating that the female plaintiff has the qualifications for
advancement possessed by others who have been promoted, that
she nevertheless was rejected, and that a man was promoted in her
place." This prima facie showing raises an inference, or suspicion,
that gender motivated the adverse decision. The employer must
then articulate the non-discriminatory reasons it claims justified the
I° See Johnson v. Transp. Agency, Santa Clara County, California, 107 S. Ct. 1442 (1987);
United States v. Paradise, 107 S. Ct. 1053 (1987); Local 28, Sheet Metal Workers' Intl Ass'n
v. EEOC, 106 S. Ct. 3019 (1986); Firefighters Local 1784 v. Stotts, 467 U.S. 561 (1984);
United Steelworkers'of Am. v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193 (1979).
" Boston Globe, Sept. 11, 1989, at 14, col. 2; Boston Globe, Aug. 23, 1989, at 3, col.
' 2
 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
13 See Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248 (1981); McDonnell
Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
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decision. Those reasons are subject to further scrutiny because the
plaintiff has the opportunity to demonstrate that they are pretextual
— mere excuses to cover bias.
Disparate treatment claims can also be pursued in the aggre-
gate, as a class action alleging deliberate systemic practices of dis-
crimination. Here the plaintiffs can establish a prima facie case by
reliance upon statistical imbalances between the number of minority
or female workers one would expect to be employed, given the
make-up of the labor market from which applicants are drawn, and
the number that are actually employed." Such imbalances raise an
inference of discriminatory motivation, requiring the employer to
come forward with another explanation.
Disparate treatment emerged from last Term relatively un-
changed. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins'' resolved the question of the
appropriate standard of causation to be applied in a Title VII case.
Ms. Hopkins was a candidate for partnership in the defendant
accounting firm, but was put on hold indefinitely and eventually
rejected. She brought a Title VII action alleging that the rejection
was based on her gender. Evidence in her favor included the almost
complete exclusion of women from the 662 partnership slots at
Price Waterhouse, and her own tremendous personal success at the
firm, including landing a $25 million contract. In addition, she
pointed to comments made by several partners in their evaluations
of her which United States District Judge Gesell found were clearly
motivated by bias against females. For example, she was criticized
for being too aggressive, and she was advised to "walk more femi-
ninely, talk more femininely, dress more femininely, wear make-up,
have her hair styled, and wear jewelry."'°
Judge Gesell found, however, that Price Waterhouse did have
additional, non-discriminatory reasons for rejecting Hopkins: pri-
marily, her lack of interpersonal skills. The problem became, there-
fore, the familiar one in individual treatment cases: sorting out the
legitimate from the discriminatory reasons. How important a role
must discrimination play in the decision before a court can say that
the decision was "because of" sex? This question had, in the words
of the Court, "left the Circuits in disarray."' 7
" See International BM. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324 (1977); Hazelwood
School Dist. v. United States, 433 U.S. 299 (1977).
15
 109 S. Ct. 1775 (1989).
'fi 618 F. Supp. 1109, 1117 (D.D.C. 1985).
17 Price Waterhouse, 109 S. Ct. at 1784 n.2. See generally Brodin. The Standard of Causation
in the Mixed-Motive Title VII Action: A Social Policy Perspective, 82 Cowm. L. REV. 292 (1982).
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Under the formulation that the Court adopted in Hopkins,
plaintiff bears the initial burden of proving that gender (or other
impermissible criteria) played a motivating part. in the challenged
decision. The defendant employer can nevertheless avoid liability
by proving (by a preponderance of the evidence) that it would have
made the same decision even if there had been no gender bias. In
effect, then, this "harmless error" standard will require litigants to
reconstruct the decisionmaking process in court and extrapolate the
likely result as if the factor of discrimination had not been present. 18
B. Disparate Impact
•	 Disparate impact discrimination is a "no-fault" theory of Title
VII liability that was developed by a unanimous Court in Griggs and
refined in the years since 1971. The decisions of the past two Terms
have changed the theory dramatically.
The premise behind impact theory is that if an ostensibly neu-
tral employment practice (such as an "objective" written examina-
tion) has an exclusionary effect that operates as the functional equiv-
alent of intentional discrimination, then that practice must be
scrutinized to determine whether it serves an essential purpose of
the employer's operation."' if the practice does not serve such a
purpose then, given its exclusionary effect, it cannot be justified
and is deemed violative of Title VII. In such a case, it is irrelevant
that deliberate intent to discriminate is lacking or cannot be proven.
Title VII, as the Griggs Court read it, is directed as much against
discriminatory effects as it is against discriminatory motivation:
"good intent or absence of discriminatory intent does not redeem
employment procedures or testing mechanisms that operate as
`built-in headwinds' for minority groups and are unrelated to mea-
suring job capability." 2 °
Thus, when the Duke Power Company in Griggs utilized "ob-
jective" selection devices like the possession of a high school diploma
" Other than the causation question, two additional points should be noted about
Hopkins. First, it confirms prior precedent. extending the coverage of Title Vii beyond the
traditional employer-employee relationship. See Hishon v, King & Spaulding, 467 U.S. 69
(1984) (partnership in a law firm). Second, it establishes that sex-stereotyping is a form of
discrimination prohibited by Title VII. An employer cannot make personnel decisions based
on stereotypical notions of the proper conduct and role of females or males.
19 See Fiss, A Theory of Fair Employment Laws, 38 U. Cm. L. REV. 235 (1971).
20 Griggs, 401 U.S. at 432. Title VII requires ''the removal of artificial, arbitrary, and
unnecessary barriers to employment when the barriers operate invidiously to discriminate
on the basis of racial or other impermissible classification." Id. at 431.
6	 BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW	 [Vol. 31:1
or the achievement of a passing grade on an intelligence test, and
those devices resulted in the disproportionate rejection of minority
applicants, 2 ' the burden shifted to the employer to show that the
devices "bear a demonstrable relationship to successful performance
of the jobs for which [they were] used." 22 It was not enough to
convince the courts, as the company did, that it had no intent or
design to exclude minorities. Rather, the "touchstone is business
necessity."23 Because Duke Power could not produce evidence of a
substantial relationship between these devices and success on the
job, the company was in effect arbitrarily excluding minority can-
didates and thus in violation of Title VII.
In the years following Griggs, the federal judiciary was actively
involved in reviewing an enormous range of "objective" selection
devices that stood as obstacles to the employment of minorities and
women, including height-weight minimums for law enforcement
positions,24 written examinations, 25 experience requirements, 26 no-
spouse hiring rules, 27 and exclusion of applicants with any record
of arrest. 28 In the process, it became apparent that many employers
had systematically over-screened their applicants, insisting on re-
quirements that might look good on paper but had little if anything
to do with the ability to perform the jobs in question. 29 Under Griggs,
there was no need to delve into the motives of the employers, and
such requirements fe11.3°
21 This was demonstrated not by actual applicant flow figures, but by resort to census
figures showing that whites in North Carolina were approximately three times more likely
to have completed high school than blacks, See id. at 430 n.6. Such potential disparate impact
also served as the basis for the decision in Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321 (1977)
(disproportionate impact of height-weight minimum for correction officer demonstrated on
the basis of national census figures). But see New York City Transit Auth. v. Beazer, 440 U.S.
568 (1979) (suggesting the necessity in certain circumstances for presentation of actual
applicant flow data to demonstrate adverse impact).
22 Griggs, 401 U.S. at 431.
25 Id.
Dothard v. Rawlingson, 433 U.S. 321 (1977).
25 Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody. 422 U.S. 405 (1975).
26 Spurlock v. United Airlines, Inc., 475 F.2d 216 (10th Cir. 1972).
EEOC v. Rath Packing Co., 787 F.2d 318 (8th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 307
(1986); Yuhas v. Libbey-Owens-Ford Co., 562 F.2d 496 (7th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S.
934 (1978).
28 Green v. Missouri Pac. R.R. Co., 523 F.2d 1290 (8th Cir. 1975).
28 See generally Brodin, Costs, Profits, and Equal Employment Opportunity, 62 Nom; DAME
L. REV. 318 (1978). Under the standards of proof that developed in impact cases, even if an
employer could prove that a challenged practice actually did predict job performance, the
plaintiff could still prevail by demonstrating that less discriminatory alternatives achieved the
same goals. See Albemarle Paper Co., 422 U.S. at 425.
'° As the Court has noted, Congress "recognized and endorsed the disparate-impact
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Title VII remained at this stage until the decision in Watson v.
Fort Worth Bank & Trust,m issued at the end of the 1987 Term. Prior
to that decision, the dividing line had been relatively sharp between
cases alleging deliberate bias and those challenging specific neutral
practices under Griggs." Watson significantly blurred that line, and
the Court's decision this Term in Wards Cove Packing Co., Inc. v.
Atonio" may have obliterated it.
Clara Watson, a black woman, was denied four promotions by
the Fort Worth Bank, all in a process of subjective evaluation by
her supervisors and in the absence of any formal or precise require-
ments for promotion. She filed a Title VII action proceeding on
both disparate impact and disparate treatment grounds. Both the
district and circuit courts rejected her impact claim, holding that
discretionary and subjective personnel systems could not be ana-
lyzed under impact theory. 34 Because this represented a split in the
circuits, the Court granted certiorari.
The Supreme Court reversed and held, with each participating
Justice in agreement, that impact theory applies equally to subjective
as well as objective personnel practices.' In the opinion of the
Court, Justice O'Connor reasoned that limitation of impact theory
to objective practices would create an incentive for employers to
abandon those merit-based practices in favor of more easily defen-
sible subjective decisionmaking, which could only be challenged
successfully upon a showing of deliberate intent to discriminate. 36
analysis employed by the Court in Griggs." Connecticut v. Teal, 457 U.S. 440, 447 n.8 (1982).
See also Thomson, The Disparate Impact Theory: Congressional Intent in 1972 — A Response to
Gold, 8 INDUS. REL. L.J. 105, 116 (1986) ("Congress ratified Griggs and the disparate impact
theory of discrimination").
When Congress has disagreed with the Court's interpretation of Title VII, it has taken
action to change it, as illustrated by its 1978 amendments of the definition section to include
pregnancy as a prohibited ground for selection, thus overruling General Eke. Co. v. Gilbert,
429 U.S. 125 (1976). Act of Oct. 31, 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-555, 92 Stat. 2076 (adding a new
§ 701(k)). See Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co. v. EEOC, 462 U.S. 669, 678
(1983) (Congress "unambiguously expressed its disapproval" of the Gilbert decision).
3 ' 108 S. Ct. 2777 (1988).
32 That line had begun to blur in Certain decisions. See A. LARSON, EMPLOYMENT DIS-
CRIMINATION § 76.32 (1989), discussing several circuit courts' extension of impact theory to
subjective selection systems. Compare Segar v. Smith, 738 F.2d 1249 (D.C.Cir. 1984) with
Pouncy v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 668 F.2d 795 (5th Cir. 1982).
as
	S. Ct. 2115 (1989).
" There were some circuit court decisions to the contrary. See Watson, 108 5, Ct. at 2783.
" Id. at 2787, 2791. In both contexts, the Court emphasized, it is the plaintiff's burden
to isolate and identify the devices allegedly responsible for any observed statistical disparities,
and to establish a causal relationship between the device and the disparity. Id. at 2788.
31' See id. at 2786.
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In stretching impact theory to cover both objective and discre-
tionary practices, however, the Watson Court also significantly
changed the nature of impact litigation. It did so by loosening the
previously tight standard of job relation set down in Griggs and its
progeny. A plurality of four Justices" indicated that employers
would no longer be required to produce in court formal validation
studies to demonstrate empirically that the challenged device pre-
dicted job performance. 38 Nor would the employer bear the burden
of proof on the question of "manifest relationship" between selec-
tion device and job. Rather, the plaintiff would have the burden of
demonstrating the lack of business necessity, or the availability of
devices that achieve the same purpose for the employer but without
the discriminatory effect. 39
Wards Cove Packing Co., Inc. v. Atonio 4° expanded impact theory
yet again to include multi-component selection systems with both
discretionary and objective features. As its dimensions grew bigger,
however, impact theory was also losing its unique no-fault character.
The litigation in Wards Cove Packing Co., Inc. involved a chal-
lenge to the hiring practices in the Alaskan salmon industry. The
defendant companies operated canneries in which jobs were divided
into skilled and unskilled, the former paying more and providing
better working conditions than the latter. The skilled jobs were filled
mostly by whites and the unskilled mostly by minorities, and the
employees were separated in different living quarters and dining
areas. Plaintiffs alleged that the racial stratification resulted from
defendants' selection practices, which included subjective and ob-
jective criteria, 4 ' and they sought to pursue both disparate treatment
and disparate impact claims.
Plaintiffs were unsuccessful on both counts in the district court.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed
and remanded, holding that the plaintiffs had made out a prima .
facie case of disparate impact on the basis of the internal workforce
statistics showing a disparity between the high percentage of whites
in the skilled jobs and the high percentage of minorities in the
unskilled jobs. 42 The Ninth Circuit further held that this shifted the
" O'Connor, Rehnquist, White, and Scalia were the four.
" 108 S. Ct. at 2790.
39 Id. at 2790-91.
" 109 S. Ct. 2115 (1989).
." These included nepotism, a rehire preference, and an English language requirement.
Id. at 2120.
42 827 F.2d 439 (9th Cir. 1987).
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burden to the employer on remand to prove that business necessity
justified the devices.
The Supreme Court reversed. While agreeing that impact the-
ory was applicable to the defendants' complex selection system, the
Court disagreed that a prima facie case had been made out. More-
over, a majority of the justices43 now held that the burden of per-
suasion on the question of business justification lies with the plain-
tiff', not the employer.'"
Since Griggs, plaintiffs have generally demonstrated discrimi-
natory impact by showing that the challenged practice had either
an actual or at least a potential exclusionary effect. Thus, in Griggs
itself, the plaintiff's proof focused on the high school diploma
requirement's effect on the potential pool of applicants: available
statewide data indicated that white applicants would be three times
more likely to possess the diploma than black applicants. In other
cases, plaintiffs have used the actual applicant pool to demonstrate
the disproportionate impact. of a particular device. 45
Thus, it is not surprising that the Wards Cove Court rejected
the internal workforce comparison used by the Ninth Circuit. 4" The
Court held that the proper comparison must be between the racial
composition of the qualified labor market from which workers are
hired and the persons holding the jobs. 47 But proof' of such a
disparity, the Court emphasized, is only the first crucial step in the
proof of an impact case. Plaintiffs must further demonstrate "spe-
cific causation," i.e., that "the disparity they complain of' is the result
of one or more of the employment practices that they are attacking
here, specifically showing that each challenged practice has a sig-
nificantly disparate impact on the employment opportunities for
" justice Kennedy joined the previous plurality From Watson.
44 109 S. Ct. at 2125-27.
' 3 See Connecticut v. Teal, 457 U.S. 440 (1982) (the impact of a civil service examination).
I" Such an approach, the Court wrote, "would mean that any employer who had a
segment. of his work force that was — for some reason — racially Unbalanced. could be haled
into court and forced to engage in the expensive and dome-consuming task of defending the
`business necessity' of the methods used to select the other members of his workforce." 109
S. Ct. at 2122.
' I Id. at 2121. Thus, for example, if the population of persons qualified to be skilled
workers for Wards Cove Packing Co. was 25% minority, and its skilled workforce was 2%
minority', the Supreme Court presumably would find the beginnings of an impact case.
This is the same comparison that is the focus of the systemic disparate treatment case,
where the statistical imbalance serves an evidentiary purpose of permitting an inference of
discriminatory motivation. See Hazelwood School Dist. v, United States, 433 U.S. '299 (1977);
International iihd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324 (1977).
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whites and non-whites." 48 The cumulative effect of several practices
cannot be used to establish the necessary causal connection."
In the context of a multi-component selection process, proving
specific causation is likely to be difficult at best. But the greater
importance of Wards Cove Packing Co., Inc. lies in its treatment of
the business justification defense. Adopting a scheme modeled on
the defense of an individual disparate treatment case, 5° the Court,
now by a five Justice majority, held that the employer simply must
produce evidence (not necessarily empirical) of business purpose,
but that the burden remains on the disparate impact plaintiff to
prove the absence of business necessity." This was a clear break from
past precedent, including the Court's own line of decisions from
Griggs to Watson. 52 Moreover, in the Wards Cove scheme, "there is
no requirement that the challenged practice be 'essential' or 'indis-
pensible' to the employer's business for it to pass muster." 53
Business necessity, in short, is no longer the affirmative defense
it was conceived of in Griggs, but rather has become a negative
element of the plaintiff's case. Given the typical imbalance in re-
sources between the litigants in discrimination cases, that burden
on the plaintiff is likely to be insurmountable in many instances.
Justice White, in his opinion for the Court in Wards Cove Packing
Co., Inc. added a telling comment regarding the scheme of proof.
He indicated that a plaintiff who could not prove the lack of busi-
ness necessity could nevertheless still prevail by proving the exis-
tence of a less discriminatory alternative — another practice that
would achieve the same purposes for the employer but without the
disparate racial or gender impact. The availability of such an alter-
native, particularly where employers refused to adopt it, "would
belie a claim by [the employers] that their incumbent practices are
being employed for non-discriminatory reasons," and demonstrate
that the practices were mere pretexts for discrimination. 54 This
statement reveals that a majority of the Court now apparently views
48 Wards Cove Packing Co., Inc., 109 S. Ct. at 2125.
49 Id. at 2124.
50 See Texas Dept of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248 (1981).
51
 Wards Cove Packing Co., Inc., 109 S. Ct. at 2125-27.
52 See id. at 2128-32, and cases collected at 2130 n.14. (Stevens, J., dissenting). "Decisions
of this Court and other federal courts repeatedly have recognized that while the employer's
burden in a disparate treatment case is simply one of coming forward with evidence of
legitimate business purpose, its burden in a disparate impact case is proof of an affirmative
defense of business necessity." Id. at 2130 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
53 Id. at 2126.
54 Id. at 2126-27.
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impact theory through fault-colored eyeglasses. 55 The Justices have,
in short, shifted the focus of impact cases to the covert intentions
and motives of the employer, the same focus as treatment cases,
and thus carrying the same substantial difficulties of proof. 56
Before Watson and Wards Cove Packing Co., Inc., impact theory
was characterized by its singular focus on objective practices, its
formidable standard of proof for the employer's demonstration of
job relation or business necessity, and its explicit rejection of any
focus on the intent or motivation of the employer in utilizing the
practice. These recent decisions materially alter each attribute and,
in so doing, place in serious doubt the future of impact theory as
an effective weapon against nonmerit-based exclusion of minorities
and women. Justice Blackmun was prompted to wonder "whether
the majority still believes that race discrimination — or, more ac-
curately, race discrimination against non-whites — is a problem in
our society, or even remembers that it ever was." 57
III. COURT AWARDED ATTORNEYS FEES
Prospective Title VII plaintiffs and their counsel will find Fur-
ther discouragement in Independent Federation of Flight Attendants v.
Zipes," a case concerning the award of attorneys fees to successful
plaintiffs. Section 706(k) of Title VII authorizes the award of attor-
neys fees to "prevailing parties." 59 The Court has previously held
that fees could be awarded to a prevailing defendant from a losing
plaintiff only if the latter's case is found to be frivolous, unreason-
able, or without foundation. In contrast, fee awards to prevailing
plaintiffs against losing defendants are to be virtually automatic.°
The distinction in standards reflects the Court's recognition that
plaintiffs are acting as private attorney generals when pursuing
Title VII cases, and should not be discouraged from doing so by a
reading of section 706(k) that leaves them open to an award of fees
55 The Court speaks of the possibility that there were few qualified nonwhite applicants
"for reasons that are not petitioners' fault," and thus that cannot constitute disparate impact.
Id. at 2122.
56 The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit presaged this shift in a
1983 opinion, referring to impact theory "as a form of pretext analysis to handle specific
employment practices not obviously job-related." Spaulding v. University of Washington, 740
F.2d 686, 707 (9th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1036 (1984).
57
 Wards Cove Packing Co., Inc., 109 S. Ct. at 2136 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
ae 109 S. Ct. 2732 (1989).
" 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k) (1982).
6' See Christiansburg Garment Co. v. EEOC, 434 U.S. 412 (1978).
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merely because they do not prevail. In contrast, a defendant who
does not prevail has by definition been adjudged a violater of fed-
eral law.
Zipes confronted the Court with the question of a fee award
against a losing intervenor. An action had been brought by female
Flight cabin attendants challenging TWA's policy of terminating
attendants who became mothers. TWA abandoned the policy, and
the focus of the litigation turned to the question of remedy for past
victims of the policy. The parties agreed to a tentative settlement
that would credit these persons with competitive seniority. At that
point the union representing the flight attendants intervened to
challenge modification of the seniority system. The challenge was
ultimately rejected after considerable litigation, and plaintiffs sub-
sequently sought an award of attorneys fees against the union. The
district court held that fee awards against intervenors should be
made under the same standard as awards against defendants (i.e.,
be virtually automatic) and the plaintiffs were awarded attorneys
fees in the amount of $181,000. 61
The Court reversed and remanded. While ruling that district
courts have the authority to award fees against unsuccessful inter-
venors, the Court held that in cases where the intervenor was not
charged or adjudged liable for its own Title VII violation, such fees
may be awarded only if the intervenor's action was frivolous, un-
reasonable, or without foundation. 62 The standard to be applied, in
other words, is the nearly insurmountable standard for the award
of fees against losing plaintiffs.
As a result of Zipes, plaintiffs in Title VII litigation will generally
have to bear the cost of litigating third-party claims and defenses
(presumably regarding liability as well as remedy). The likely con-
sequence of the decision, Justice Marshall observed in his dissent,
will be that
defendants can rely on intervenors to raise many of their
defenses, thereby minimizing the fee exposure of defen-
dants and forcing prevailing plaintiffs to litigate many, if
not most, of their claims against parties from whom they
have no chance of recovering fees. Without the hope of
obtaining compensation for the expenditures caused by
intervenors, many victims of discrimination will be forced
" 1 Airline Stewards & Stewardesses Ass'n v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 640 F. Supp.
861, 867 (N. D. III. 1986).
Zipes, 109 S. Ct. at 2739.
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to forgo remedial litigation for lack of financial resources.
As a result, injuries will go unredressed and the national
policy against discrimination will go unredeemed."'
IV. THE AFFIRMATIVE AcrioN QUESTION
Since the mid-1970s the "affirmative action" issue has domi-
nated the political discourse regarding fair employment law. Is it
permissible, in the interest of remedying the effects of past discrim-
ination, to employ race-conscious preferences that in themselves
constitute a form of "reverse discrimination?" Stated differently, the
issue is the extent to which a court may order — or litigants may
consent to, or employers may voluntarily adopt — group relief that
goes beyond compensating actual victims of discrimination. The
emotion of the issue is created in large part by the fact that we are
talking about a zero-sum game: if minorities or females are to be
given a preference, whites and males will generally be disadvan-
taged.
Since Regents of the University of California v. Bakke," the Su-
preme Court has been struggling with the question of race-con-
scious relief. As a matter of' enforcing Title VII and other civil
rights statutes, it has long been argued that merely making actual
victims whole will neither significantly advance employment oppor-
tunities for minorities and women, nor present a credible deterrent
against future violations. The granting of race-conscious relief fol-
lowing a determination of liability under Title VII thus has become
a familiar part of the legal landscape, and has secured the approval
of the Supreme Court. 65 As the Court has observed, the purpose
of such relief "is not to make identified victims whole, but rather to
dismantle prior patterns of employment discrimination and to pre-
vent discrimination in the future."""
The more difficult question is the extent to which an employer
or labor union voluntarily may impose race-based remedies on the
workplace. Beginning with United - Steelworkers of America v. Weber, 1i 7
6" Id. at 2746 (Marshall, I.  dissenting).
'4 438 U.S. 265 (1978). This case dealt with the setting aside for minority applicants of
a number of positions hi the medical school entering class. An earlier case raising the question,
Dennis v. Odegaard, 416 U.S. 312 (1974), was dismissed as moot.
65 See United States v. Paradise, 107 S. Ct. 1053 (1987); Local 28, Sheet Metal Workers'
Intl Ass'n v. EEOC, 478 U.S. 421 (1986).
6" 478 U.S. at 474-75.
"7 443 U,S. 193 (1979).
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a majority of the Supreme Court has supported the concept of
voluntary affirmative action, within certain limitations. Over the
dissent of Justice Rehnquist and Chief Justice Burger, the Weber
Court rejected a Title VII reverse discrimination case brought by a
white man challenging a private sector affirmative action program
(reserving fifty percent of the crafts training positions for black
employees) negotiated as part of the collective bargaining agree-
ment. The Court developed a two-part analysis for review of such
plans. 68 First, there had to be sufficient justification for such action,
which in Weber came in the form of a long-standing underrepresen-
tation locally and nationally of minorities in the particular industry.
Second, the plan had to be "narrowly tailored" and not overly-
broad. Thus, the racial preference would have to be temporary
(e.g., expire when parity was reached); not completely exclude
whites from the jobs; not require the discharge of whites to make
room for blacks; and constitute a flexible goal rather than an un-
yielding quota.
Since Weber, the Court has revisited the voluntary affirmative
action question in the context of public employers, and it has tight-
ened its scrutiny of such preferences. 69 In Wygant v. Jackson Board
of Education, 7° the Court struck down (under the Equal Protection
Clause) the preferential layoff protection provision of a collective
bargaining agreement between the Board of Education and the
teachers' union. The provision suspended the previous reverse se-
niority layoff practice. A plurality of the Justices rejected the notion
that societal discrimination alone could justify such race-conscious
decisionmaking by a public employer. Rather, in his opinion for the
Court, Justice Powell emphasized the need for "particularized find-
ings" of discrimination — the employer "must have sufficient evi-
dence to justify the conclusion that there ha[d] been prior discrim-
ination." 71
61 It should be noted that the majority declined "to define in detail the line of demarcation
between permissible and impermissible affirmative action plans." Id. at 208.
69 It has been argued that the Court has applied basically the same standards to Title
VII and Equal Protection cases. See generally Note, Voluntary Public Employer Affirmative Action:
Reconciling Title VII Consent Decrees with The Equal Protection Claims of Majority Employees, 28
B.C.L. REV. 1007 (1987). But see Johnson v. Santa Clara Transp. Auth., 107 S. Ct. 1442, 1449
n.6 (1987) (suggesting that the standards are not identical).
'" 106 S. Ct. 1842 (1986).
71 Id. at 1848. Such evidence was found lacking in the record below. Moreover, the layoff
preference was held to violate the requirement that race•conscious relief must be narrowly
tailored because the challenged plan required the discharge of senior white teachers, in.favor
of junior black teachers. Id,
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In her concurring opinion, Justice O'Connor read this as not
requiring that the programs' adoption "be accompanied by contem-
poraneous findings of actual discrimination," but simply that "the
public actor has a firm basis for believing that remedial action is
required." 72 She added that "[t]he imposition of a requirement that
public employers make findings that they have engaged in illegal
discrimination before they engage in affirmative action programs
would severely undermine public employers' incentive to meet vol-
untarily their civil rights obligations."" As will be seen, the Court
came very close to imposing just such a requirement last Term.
In its 1987 Term, the Court upheld the operation of a gender-
preference plan unilaterally adopted by a public employer. Johnson
v. Transportation Agency, Santa Clara County, California 74 rejected the
Title VII claim of a white male who was denied a promotion in
favor of a female ranked immediately below him on the civil service
eligible list. Diane Joyce got the job pursuant to an affirmative action
plan that made gender a factor in the selection process. Recognizing
that "voluntary employer action can play a crucial role in furthering
Title VII's purpose of eliminating the effects of discrimination in
the workplace," 75 the majority rejected the dissent's assertion that
affirmative action plans may be adopted only upon a showing that
the employer itself had engaged in past discrimination. 76 Such a
standard would thwart voluntary efforts because "the prospect of
liability created by such an admission would create a significant
disincentive for voluntary action." 77 Rather, the justification neces-
sary to support affirmative action is the existence of "manifest im-
balance" reflecting the underrepresentation of the group in ques-
tion.78 The statistics demonstrating this imbalance would have to be
finely tuned to the qualified labor market from which the positions
have been filled, and not simply a comparison to the general pop-
ulation. 79 Because none of the 238 skilled crafts positions at issue in
Johnson was filled by a female, the Court found sufficient justifica-
tion for affirmative action. Moreover, the Court concluded that the
agency's plan was narrowly tailored in that it set flexible goals in-
" Id. at 1853 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
" Id. at 1855 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
74 107 S. Ct. 1442 (1987).
" Id. at 1451.
76 Id. at 1451 n.8.
77 id .
78 Id. at 1452.
79 Id.
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stead of a fixed quota, and gender was only one of several factors
considered in the promotion decision. 8°
Last Term's decision in City of Richmond v. J.A.Croson Co.,"
while reflecting a continuing consensus in favor of the concept of
affirmative action, represents so significant a tightening of the jus-
tification necessary to support it that many potential initiators will
be discouraged from acting. The City of Richmond, Virginia, had
adopted a Minority Business Utilization Plan which set aside thirty
percent of city construction contracts to go to minority-owned firms.
The adoption of the plan was based not on evidence that the city
had actually discriminated against minority contractors, but rather
on the imbalance between a black population of fifty percent and
minority participation in city contracts of less than one percent. An
unsuccessful white bidder challenged the plan as unconstitutional.
Although disagreeing on the appropriate standard of scrutiny,
all the Justices except Scalia concluded that under the right circum-
stances, race-conscious relief was lawful.82 Justices O'Connor, Rehn-
quist, White, and Kennedy adopted "strict scrutiny" as the appro-
priate level of review, holding that such plans would have to be
narrowly designed to remedy the present effects of identifiable past
discrimination. 83
While a ten percent minority set-aside adopted by Congress for
federal construction projects had previously passed constitutional
muster," the Richmond plan was struck down. The majority held
that it suffered from the same defects as the lay-off preference in
Wygant: the City did not have "a strong basis in evidence to support
its conclusion that remedial action was necessary" to remedy past
discrimination, and the plan was not "narrowly tailored" to remedy
prior discrimination. 8'
80 Such an approach has been referred to as the "Harvard Plan." See td. at 1455.
" 109 S. Ct. 706 (1989).
82
 Justice Scalia wrote separately and espoused the absolute colorblind principle: govern-
ment may not prefer persons of one race over the other, but must merely compensate proven
victims of discrimination. Id. at 735 (Scalia, J., concurring), Justice Kennedy indicated his
agreement with this view, but joined O'Connor in deference to precedent. Id. at 734 (Ken-
nedy, J., concurring).
" Justice Stevens preferred not to engage in the debate over the proper standard of
review. Id. at 732 (Stevens, J., concurring). Justices Marshall, Brennan, and Blackmun argued
for a more relaxed "important governmental objectives" standard. Id. at 743-45 (Marshall,
J., dissenting).
84 See Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448 (1980), The Croson Court held that affirmative
action instituted by state and local governments must be scrutinized more strictly than that
which is the product of Congressional action. See City of Richmond, 109 S. Ct. at 717-20.
85 The Court concluded that "none of the evidence presented by the city points to any
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Justice O'Connor wrote the opinion of the Court. In discussing
the factual justification necessary to support a race preference, she
rejected the Fourth Circuit's view that a city's minority set-aside
could be justified only by findings of past discrimination on the part
of the city itself. 8" Rather, a showing that the city had been a "passive
participant" in systematic exclusion of minorities by private industry
would suffice to support the set-aside. 87 But general comparisons
of minority population with minority participation would not suf-
fice; only particularized findings of past discrimination would justify
a set-aside. 88 Moreover, the Court seems to suggest that the city
must identify and define the discrimination prior to the adoption of
the plan, so that it may narrowly tailor the remedy to the problem."
Beyond these concerns, the governmental unit contemplating
affirmative action must consider (and perhaps attempt) race-neutral
means to redress the past discrimination such as programs of train-
ing or financial aid to small businesses."° Racial preferences are to
be reserved for "the extreme case" in which alternatives, including
"appropriate measures" against known perpetrators of discrimina-
tion, fail to dismantle the closed system."' Further, the goal set for
minority participation must not amount to "outright racial balanc-
ing," but must reflect labor market realities." 2 Lastly, programs
should include provisions for waivers in which a non-preferred
bidder is given the opportunity to demonstrate that the party claim-
ing the preference has not suffered the effects of discrimination."'
In short, while the Court continues to profess preference for
voluntary as opposed to court-ordered compliance with civil rights
laws, it has established an impressive array of obstacles that must
be negotiated prior to engaging in affirmative action.` 1 Justice
identified discrimination in the Richmond construction industry." 109 S. Ct. at 727. Moreover,
Justice O'Connor noted that the definition of minority in the Richmond plan included black,
Spanish-speaking, Oriental, Indian, Eskimo, and Aleut. Because of the complete absence of
evidence of past discrimination in that community against five of these groups, the scope of
this definition obviously went beyond the narrow confines of remedying the effects of such
past treatment. '[he plan, in short, was deemed "grossly overinclusive." Id. at 728.
86 Id. at 716-17.
" hi, at 720.
88 Id. at 723-25.
89 Id. at 723•-•30.
hi. at 728-30.
g' Id. at 729.
,12 Id. There is a distinct risk that defining the appropriate remedial goal by reference to
minority participation in the racially closed market will perpetuate underrepresentation.
93 Id. at 728-29.
" justice Marshall described the decision as "a deliberate and giant step backward in
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O'Connor rejects the concern that localities will not engage in the
"bureaucratic effort necessary to tailor remedial relief to those who
truly have suffered the effects of prior discrimination," 95 but Croson
will undoubtedly serve as a major disincentive against affirmative
action. 96 The political as well as financial costs to a locality of doc-
umenting a case of identifiable past discrimination in an industry
are not to be underestimated.
Thus, though the concept of affirmative action seems safe with
the Court for the indefinite future, its reality clearly is going to be
a different story. Post-Croson challenges to existing set-asides have
been filed around the nation, and those programs have not fared
well under that decision's strict scrutiny. 97
A decision that may prove equally destructive to the future of
race-conscious relief is Martin v. Wilks. 98 This case involved a collat-
eral challenge to a consent decree, entered in a prior Title VII
action, which established goals for the hiring and promotion of
minorities in various agencies of Birmingham, Alabama. The Su-
preme Court had previously recognized the propriety of such mu-
tually agreeable relief in the context of resolving Title VII litiga-
tion.99
this Court's affirmative action jurisprudence," a "grapeshot attack on race-conscious remedies
in general," and a "full-scale retreat from the Court's longstanding solicitude to race-conscious
remedial efforts." Id. at 740, 757 (Marshall, J., dissenting). He read the majority as signalling
"that it regards racial discrimination as largely a phenomenon of the past, and that govern-
ment bodies need no longer preoccupy themselves with rectifying racial injustice." Id. at 752.
95 Id. at 729.
96
 As the dissenters saw it, the decision "will inevitably discourage or prevent govern-
mental entities, particularly States and localities, from acting to rectify the scourge of past
discrimination." Id. at 740 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
97 See, e.g., Milwaukee County Pavers Ass'n v. Fielder, 707 F. Supp 1016 (W.D. Wis. 1989)
(A state statutory set-aside program designed to increase participation of "socially and eco-
nomically disadvantaged" businesses in the awarding of highway contracts was preliminarily
enjoined under Croson. The court concluded that the Croson criteria for evaluating race-
conscious plans applied to this program because there was a statutory presumption that
minority groups are socially disadvantaged and thus within the program's preference), mod-
ified on other grounds, 710 F. Supp. 1532 (W.D. Wis. 1989); American Subcontractors Ass'n v.
Atlanta, 259 Ga. 14, 376 S.E.2d 662 (1989). (The City of Atlanta's minority and female
business enterprise set-aside program was held to violate the Georgia Constitution's equal
protection clause. Applying the Croson strict scrutiny analysis, the court found "woefully
inadequate" the evidence offered to demonstrate a "strong basis" for the conclusion that
remedial action was necessary. The court found studies indicating a general under-utilization
of minority contractors in the nation and the state insufficient to support the city's program.
The court further concluded that the plan was not "narrowly tailored" because it was not
linked to identifiable past discrimination and the city had failed to explore less drastic
alternative remedies).
98
 109 S. Ct. 2180 (1989).
" See Local 93, Intl Ass'n of Firefighters v. City of Cleveland, 106 S. Ct. 3063 (1986),
in which the Court rejected a challenge to a consent decree that provided race-conscious
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Martin began with a 1974 case brought by the NAACP, chal-
lenging the City of Birmingham's hiring and promotion practices.
A trial was held in 1976, and the district judge found that the
defendants' test used to screen entry-level applicants was racially
biased. A second trial was then held, focusing on promotion prac-
tices. Before the decision was rendered, however, the parties ne-
gotiated two consent decrees providing long- and short-term goals
for minority hiring and promotion in various agencies, including
the fire department. Notice of these proposed decrees was pub-
lished in local newspapers, and a hearing was held prior to final
approval. The Firefighters Association appeared at the hearing and
filed objections to the decrees as amicus curiae. Other objections
came from certain black firefighters, who attacked the decrees as
inadequate, and individual white firefighters, who opposed the race
preferences. 100
After the hearing, the Firefighters Association sought to inter-
vene to oppose the proposed decrees, but the district court denied
intervention as untimely.'" The district court overruled the objec-
tions that had been raised and approved the decrees, finding strong
indication in the record that the City would ultimately be found
liable for the alleged discrimination, and that the remedy provided
in the decrees was flexible and narrowly tailored within the param-
eters of Weber, et al. In addition, the court responded to the specific
objections that had been raised to the entry of the decrees. In short,
there was a "genuine adversary proceeding" and a full airing of the
issues surrounding the propriety of the relief orderecli°2
remedies benefitting persons who were not actual victims of discrimination. The decree had
been entered in a Title VII action over the objections of the intervenor union.
Compare Firefighters Local 1784 v. Stotts, 467 U.S. 561 (1984), in which the Court
overturned a district court order providing for a minority preference against layoff in the
Memphis Fire Department. The court had issued the order, which suspended the last-in/
first-out seniority system, to protect the gains in minority employment that had resulted from
earlier affirmative action consent decrees providing for preferential hiring. The Stotts Court
held that such interference with the operation of a bona fide seniority system could not be
justified except to compensate actual victims of past discrimination. Id. at 583.
The Reagan Justice Department, under Ed Meese, seized upon the Stotts decision as the
deathknell of race-conscious relief and so notified state and local governments around the
nation. The Court subsequently explicitly rejected so broad a reading of Stotts. See Local 28,
Sheet Metal Workers v. EEOC, 106 S. Ct. 3019, 3048-50 (1986).
I" 109 S. Ct. at 2183, 2191.
t°' The Eleventh Circuit subsequently affirmed the order denying leave to intervene,
together with the dismissal of an earlier collateral suit brought by seven white firefighters
challenging the operation of the consent decrees. See Martin, 109 S. Ct. at 2183; United States
v. Jefferson County, 720 F.2d 1511 (11th Cir. 1983).
105 See Martin, 109 S. Ct. at 2191-92 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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Some two years after the consent decrees were entered, Wilks
and several other white Birmingham firefighters filed a Title VII
action against the city, alleging that they were denied promotion
because of their race. The defendants admitted that they were
making race-conscious decisions, pursuant to the consent decrees,
and thus moved to dismiss the reverse discrimination case as an
impermissible collateral attack on those decrees.
The courts had widely recognized and applied the "impermis-
sible collateral attack" doctrine as necessary to protect the integrity
and finality of judicial decrees. 10" Under it, persons who might be
adversely affected by the relief sought in a litigation, and who are
aware of such litigation, must seek to intervene in those proceedings
in order to have their input. If they decide to pass up the oppor-
tunity to intervene, then they will not be permitted to challenge the
relief issued in a subsequent new proceeding.
The Willa plaintiffs had been aware of the prior discrimination
case, and of the proposed consent decrees, but had not sought to
intervene or interpose objections to the decrees; therefore, the dis-
trict court dismissed their action. The Eleventh Circuit reversed and
remanded for a trial on the merits. The court explicitly parted
company with the other circuits on the question of collateral attack,
holding that the "strong public policy in favor of voluntary affir-
mative action plans" had to "yield to the policy against requiring
third parties to submit to bargains in which their interests were
either ignored or sacrificed."'"
On certiorari, the United States Supreme Court affirmed,
agreeing with the Eleventh Circuit that the white firefighters were
entitled to challenge the prior consent decrees in a separate pro-
ceeding. In a sweeping opinion premised on the "principle of gen-
eral application in anglo-American jurisprudence that one is not
bound by a judgment in personam in litigation in which he is not
designated as a party or to which he has not been made a party by
service of process," the Court rejected the impermissible collateral
"' As the Court in Marlin noted, the doctrine "commanded the approval of the great
majority of federal courts of appeals." Id. at 2185 (& cases collected at 2185 n.3). See also 2
A. LARSON, supra note 32, 56.24, at 11-84.9 (and cases cited). The doctrine served to
"immunize parties to a consent decree from charges of discrimination by nonparties for
actions taken pursuant to the decree." 109 S. Ct. at 2184. Collateral attack on certain narrow
grounds, such as lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter or collusion in the entry of the
decree, was permitted. Id. at 2189 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
'" In re Birmingham Reverse Discrimination Employment Litig., 833 F.2d 1492, 1498
(llth Cir. 1987).
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attack doctrine.'" The opinion by Chief Justice Rehnquist holds
that the burden of intervention cannot any longer be placed on the
person whose interest may be adversely affected by the relief re-
quested in the litigation. Rather, the burden is now on the civil
rights plaintiffs to join such parties under FRCP 19. The Court
wrote:
The parties to a lawsuit presumably know better than
anyone else the nature and scope of relief sought in the
action, and at whose expense such relief might be granted.
It makes sense, therefore, to place on them a burden of
bringing in additional parties where such a step is indi-
cated, rather than placing on potential additional parties
a duty to intervene when they acquire knowledge of the
lawsuit. The linchpin of the "impermissible collateral at-
tack" doctrine — the attribution of preclusive effect to a
failure to intervene — is therefore quite inconsistent with
Rule 19 and Rule 24. 1 "
The Martin Court conceded that there are "difficulties" in-
volved in "identifying those who could be adversely affected by a
1 °5 109 S. Ct. at 2184 (quoting Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32, 40 (1940)). While the four
dissenters conceded this principle, they contended that a decree may nevertheless permissibly
affect nonparties:
There is no reason, however, why the consent decrees might not produce
changes in conditions at the white firelighters' place of employment that, as a
practical maner, may have a serious effect on their opportunities for employ-
ment or promotion even though they are not bound by the decrees in any legal
sense. The fact that one of the effects of a decree is to curtail the job oppor-
tunities of nonparties does not mean that the nonparties have been deprived
of legal rights or that they have standing to appeal from the decree without
becoming parties.
Id. at 2189 (Stevens, j., dissenting).
' 06 Id. at 2186. It should be noted that the drafters of FRCP 19 explicitly contemplated
intervention of the absent party as an alternative to mandatory joinder: "IT]he absentee may
sometimes be able to avert prejudice to himself by voluntarily appearing in the action or
intervening . . . ." EF.D. R. Cnr. P. 19 Advisory Committee's Note to 1966 Amendment.
Indeed, the drafters noted that "10 some situations it may be desirable to advise a person
who has not been joined of the fact that the action is pending, and in particular cases the
court in its discretion may itself convey this information by directing a letter or other informal
notice to the absentee." Id.
Chief Justice Rehnquist's view that the proper route in civil rights cases is mandatory
joinder, and riot voluntary intervention, had been previously expressed by him as a minority
view. See Carpenters 46 Northern California Counties JATC v. Eldredge, 459 U.S. 917, 921-
22 (1982) (Rehnquist, , l,, dissenting from denial of certiorari) ("It is respondents who have
sought to affect the hiring practices of some 4500 employers; it is respondents, and not the
absent employers, who should shoulder the responsibility of joining the necessarily affected
employers or suffering dismissal of their lawsuits").
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decree granting broad remedial relief" and joining them in the
suit.'°7
 Yet, in the Court's eyes the problem results from the broad
equitable relief plaintiffs request in civil rights cases, and thus these
plaintiffs should.suffer the consequences.'"
It would be difficult to conjure up a more begrudging indul-
gence of the right of minorities and women to seek remedies for
discriminatory conduct. It would be equally difficult to imagine a
more chilling precedent for prospective plaintiffs and their counsel
who, if they contemplate federal litigation to enforce their rights to
equal opportunity, must now confront the arduous task of identi-
fying and joining any and all parties whom the desired relief might
at some point impact,'" It would be harder still to devise a scenario
more likely to discourage defendants from entering into consent
decrees than this one, in which an unjoined person lurking in the
wings may at any point emerge with a lawsuit in which liability is
predicated upon compliance with the original consent judgment."°
Martin v. Wilks opens all existing consent decrees to collateral
attack and presumably relitigation of the underlying issues.'" If the
107 109 S. Ct. at 2187.
' 08 The problems "arise from the nature of the relief sought." Id. at 2187.
1 °0 It must be remembered that the failure to join indispensible parties is grounds for
dismissal of the federal action. See FED. R. Clv. P. 19(b); Eldredge, 459 U.S. at 923 (Rehnquist,
J., dissenting). But "the possibility of an adverse effect on non parties, even when it is entitled
to consideration, should not automatically result in dismissal of the action if they are not
joined." F. JAMES & G. HAZARD, CIVIL PROCEDURE § 10.12, at 535 (3d ed. 1985) (& citations).
Failure to join an indispensible party is not a jurisdictional defect depriving the court of
power to act. Id. at 544.
110
 This is particularly troublesome because as one treatise puts it,
Settlements are generally favored in the law for reasons of judicial economy
and because it is expected that the parties will generally be more satisfied by a
process of self-imposed compromise and agreement than by court-imposed
adjudication, particularly in light of the savings in time and expense for the
litigants.
In employment discrimination cases, settlements are especially favored.
Such cases are often so protracted — involving multiple appeals, intervening
changes in the decisional law, a decade or more of unresolved conflict, and
massive legal fees — that they rival antitrust litigation. The savings in time and
expense to both the court and the litigants is therefore more valuable in em-
ployment discrimination cases . .
2 A. LARSON, supra note 32, - § 56.10, at 11-81 (citations omitted).
III This is an interesting result for Chief Justice Rehnquist to reach, given his adamant
commitment to the doctrines of finality in other contexts. In Federated Dep't Stores, Inc. v.
Moitie, 452 U.S. 394 (1981), the Court, in an opinion by justice Rehnquist, rejected the view
of the Ninth Circuit that there shoUld be a "public policy" exception to the doctrine of res
judicata. The exception would have permitted non-appealing plaintiff consumers to benefit
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Court's decision is what it appears to be, namely a call for what in
an earlier era of the civil rights struggle would be termed "massive
resistence" to the civil rights decrees of federal courts," 2 then the
march to undo court-approved affirmative action around the nation
is underway." 3 It is apparent that court clerks are going to be
dusting off a lot of dead case files in the coming years.
Moreover, the Court's rejection of the impermissible collateral
attack doctrine would seem to apply equally well to relief ordered
by a judge after full trial and without the consent of the parties." 4
from a reversal of a judgment based on precedent that the Supreme Court had since
overruled. Rehnquist wrote that
"A judgment merely voidable because based upon an erroneous view of the law
is not open to collateral attack, but can be corrected only by a direct review and
not by bringing another action upon the same cause [of action)." We have
observed that "[t]he indulgence of a contrary view would result in creating
elements of uncertainty and confusion and in undermining the conclusive character of
judgments, consequences which it was the very purpose of the doctrine of res
judicata to avert."
.	 .
"Simple justice" is achieved when a complex body of law developed over a
period of years is even-handedly applied. The doctrine of res judicata serves
vital public interests beyond any individual judge's ad hoc determination of the
equities in a particular case, There is simply "no principle of law or equity which
sanctions the rejection by a federal court of the salutary principle of res judi-
cata.
Id. at 398-99, 401. (citations omitted; emphasis added). The Chief Justice had previously
weighed in against approaches that "tend to reduce the district courts to issuers of 'paper
decrees which neither adjudicate nor, in the end, protect rights.' This is hardly a sound way
to expend the energies of overburdened district judges.''Eldredge, 459 U.S. at 922 (Rehnquist.,
J., dissenting). See also Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976), in which the Court excluded
from federal habeas corpus review claims that the petitioner's conviction resulted from the
introduction of evidence seized in violation of the fourth amendment. The Court, per Justice
Powell (with Rehnquist participating), explained that such collateral review and relitigation
undermined "the necessity of finality in criminal trials." 428 U.S. at 465 n,31.
112 See generally R. KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE 948-52 (1975); D. BELL, RACE, RACISM AND
AMERICAN LAW 381-87 (2d ed. 1980).
Justice Scalia was overt in his encouragement to potential intervenors who seek to
challenge proposed affirmative action consent decrees: "an intervenor of the sort before us
here is particularly welcome since we have stressed the necessity of protecting, in Title VII
litigation, 'the legitimate expectations of employees . . innocent of any wrongdoing.'"
Independent Federation of Flight Attendants v. Zipes, 109 S. Ct. 2732, 2737-38 (1989)
(citation omitted).
I" See, e,g., Boston Globe, June 13, 1989 at 6, col. 6; at 17, col. I. Both articles describe
the plans to challenge affirmative action decrees in force in the Boston police and fire
department since the 1970's.
" 4 As Justice Stevens observed,
Any remedy that seeks to create employment conditions that would have ob-
tained if there had been no violations of law will necessarily have an adverse
impact on whites, who must now share their job and promotion opportunities
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Thus, under the regime envisioned by Marlin, a judgment entered
by a court of competent jurisdiction and final at the completion of
the appellate review process may be reopened by another court.
There is "no end to litigation and no fixed established rights"; a
"judgment, though unreversed and irreversible, would no longer
be a final adjudication of the rights of the litigants, but the starting
point from which a new litigation would spring up."" 5 And the
Court has failed to indicate any time limit on the right to pursue
collateral attack.
This apparent lack of concern regarding time limitations and
repose contrasts sharply with the Court's disposition of another civil
rights case decided the same day as Marlin v. Wilks. In Lorance v.
AT&T Technologies, Inc.," 6 three black women had filed a Title VII
action challenging the modification of AT&T's seniority system in
a way that ultimately caused them to be demoted from their posi-
tions. The plaintiffs asserted that the modifications, which had oc-
curred in 1979 but were not applied to them until 1982, had been
designed to protect certain positions for incumbent white males.
Concluding that the limitations period should run from the point
at which the seniority system was altered, and not the point at which
such changes actually impacted the plaintiffs, the Court held that
the complaints must be dismissed as untimely. The Court reached
this result despite the fact that "[o]n the day AT&T's seniority
system was adopted, there was no reason to believe that a woman
who exercised her plantwide seniority to become a tester would ever
be demoted as a result of the new system."" 7 justice Scalia explained
for the majority that "allowing a facially neutral system to be chal-
lenged, and entitlements under it to be altered, many years after
with blacks. Just as white employees in the past were innocent beneficiaries of
illegal discriminatory practices, so is it inevitable that some of the same white
employees will be innocent victims who must share sonic of the burdens result-
ing from the redress of past wrongs.
109 S: Ct. at 2200 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
"6 Id. at 2196 n.21 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citation omitted).
"6 109 S. Ct. 2261 (1989).
17 Id. at 2270 (Marshall, J., dissenting). The Court's limitations ruling applies "even if
the employee who subsequently challenges that system could not reasonably have expected
to be demoted or otherwise concretely harmed by the new system at the time of its adoption,
and, indeed, even if the employee was not working in the affected division of the company
at the time of the system's adoption." Id.
Lorance also continues the special treatment afforded seniority systems under Title VII,
immunizing them from attack on anything other than a showing of actual discriminatory
intent. See id. at 2265, 2267. See generally Brodin, The Role of Fault and Motive in Defining
Discrimination: The Seniority Question Under Title VII, 62 REV. 943 (1984).
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its adoption would disrupt those valid reliance interests that § 703(h)
[the seniority proviso of Title VII] was meant to protect."' 18
Thus, on the same day, the Court issued one decision allowing
white males, who were aware of but had declined to join a federal
action seeking to restructure personnel practices in their depart-
ment, to pursue a subsequent collateral attack on the prior judg-
ment; and another decision dismissing an action by black females
because they were obligated "to anticipate, and initiate suit to pre-
vent, future adverse applications of a seniority system, no matter
how speculative or unlikely these applications may be.""° The Lor-
ance result was justified as necessary to avoid disrupting the reliance
of white males on an allegedly discriminatory seniority system; yet,
the Court exhibited no such concern in Martin v. Wilks for the
reliance interests surrounding the final remedial decree of a federal
district court.
V. 42 U.S.C. § 1981
The focus of much of the public and legal profession's attention
during the 1988 Term was on the landmark post-Civil War enact-
ment now codified at 42 U.S.0 section 1981. The statute provides
black citizens with "the same right to make and enforce contracts
as is enjoyed by white citizens."
After allowing it to lie dormant for 100 years, the Supreme
Court revived section 1981 in the mid-1970s as a remedy for private
(as well as public) sector race discrimination that supplemented (and
was not supplanted by) Title VII.' 2° The statute quickly became a
popular vehicle for challenging discrimination, as it affords several
notable advantages over Title VII. It is not limited to employers of
fifteen or more employees, as is Title VII. It is not confined by the
short statutory limitations period, nor the administrative exhaustion
requirements, of the 1964 act. Unlike Title VII actions, jury trials
are available in section 1981 claims. And, perhaps most important,
while Title VII monetary damages are limited to lost wages and
benefits (an• those only for a period of two years prior to the filing
of the administrative complaint), prevailing plaintiffs in section
1981 cases can recover tort damages — compensatory damages for
"" Lorance, 109 S. Ci. at 2269.
" 9 Id. at 2273 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
12 " See 3 A. LARSON, supra note 32, § 88.00, at 18-1 to 18.22 (1989); M. PLAYER, EMPLOY..
MENT DISCRIMINATION LAW 1311-19 (1988); M. ZIMMER, C. SULLIVAN & R. RICHARDS, CASES
& MATERIALS ON EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION 894-95 (2d ed. 1988).
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emotional distress and humiliation, and, in appropriate cases, pu-
nitive damages as well.'" This latter distinction becomes most im-
portant in those cases in which the plaintiff is allegedly subjected
to unlawful harassment but can point to no tangible lost pay or
fringe benefit for which monetary relief is available under Title
VII.
During the 1987 Term, five of the Justices, acting on their own
initiative and without any request from the parties to the lawsuit,
decided to use the case of Patterson v. McLean Credit Union as a
vehicle to reconsider those decisions that had given Reconstruction
Era statutes like section 1981 new life. Waves of anxiety were sent
through the civil rights community. .
Brenda Patterson had filed her action claiming that as a teller
employed by the defendant credit union for ten years, she had been
subjected to systematic harassment and mistreatment — including
the refusal to promote her or give her routine wage increases, and
her ultimate discharge from employment — based on the fact that
she was black. The district court determined that a claim for racial
harassment was not actionable under section 1981, and thus de-
clined to submit that part of the case to the jury at trial. The United
States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit agreed and affirmed.
After hearing oral argument on this point, the Supreme Court
ordered the parties to file briefs addressed to the question of
whether section 1981 prohibited discrimination in the private sector,
and the case was set down for reargument.' 22
The Court issued its long-awaited decision in Patterson on June
15, 1989, deciding not to overrule its prior decisions holding that
section 1981 prohibits racial discrimination in the making of private
employment contracts.'" But as Justice Brennan observed, "[w]hat
the Court declines to snatch away with one hand it takes away with
the other." 124 The five-Justice majority held that section 1981 applies
only to the formation of the employment contract itself, and not to
conduct that occurs after the parties enter into the contract. Thus
section 1981 is not to be interpreted as a general prohibition against
discrimination in employment, but merely a protection of the op-
portunity to enter into an employment contract on non-racial terms.
Breach of the terms of that contract, as well as the imposition of
12 ' See generally A. LARSON, supra note 32, § 88.00, at 18-23 to 18-56.
122 Patterson, 109 S. Ct. at 2369.
123 Id. at 2369-71.
144 Id. at 2379 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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discriminatory working conditions once employment has begun, are
no longer actionable under section 1981. 125 Rather, plaintiffs must
pursue such claims under the more restrictive provisions of Title
While the nature of section 1981's prohibition was thus sub-
stantially narrowed by Patterson, the scope of municipal liability in
public sector cases under the statute was also curtailed during the
1988 Term. In Jett v. Dallas Independent School District,' 27 a white man
employed by the Dallas school system as a teacher and head football
coach at a predominantly black high school brought a section 1981
action alleging racial discrimination. Jett asserted that the recom-
mendation of the school principal, a black man, that he be removed
from his coaching position, as well as his subsequent transfer by the
superintendent to another school where he had no coaching re-
sponsibilities, were racially motivated. The jury found for the plain-
tiff and awarded him $650,000 against the school district, $150,000
against the principal and school district jointly and severally, and
$50,000 in punitive damages against the principal in his individual
capacity. 128
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit re-
versed in part and remanded, holding that municipal liability under
section 1981 must be limited in the same manner that the Court
had previously held it to be under section 1983; 120 that is, a locality
is liable for the conduct of its official only if that official either has
been delegated policymaking authority, or acted pursuant to a well
settled custom amounting to official policy. This decision placed the
Fifth Circuit at odds with the other circuits that had ruled on this
125 With regard to Patterson's claim that she had been discriminatorily denied promotion,
the Court suggested that if it could be shown that the change in position would have
constituted a new contract with the employer, then the claims would be actionable under
section 1981.
126 As noted above, that means that victims of racial harassment will be unable to obtain
monetary compensation for their emotional distress. The only remedy Title VII affords for
such harassment is prospective injunctive relief. See generally A. LARSON, supra note 32, § 88.00,
at 18-23 to 18-56.
Four members of the Court would have held that a plaintiff states a valid claim under
§ 1981 if "the acts constituting the harassment were sufficiently severe or pervasive as
effectively to belie any claim that the contract was entered into in a racially neutral manner."
109 S. Ct. at 2389 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
122
 109 S. Ct. 2702 (1989).
122 Defendants did not raise the issue of whether section 1981 covered this type of post-
contract conduct, and thus the Court noted but declined to rule on the Patterson question
here. Id. at 2709-10.
129 See Monell v. New York City Dept of Social Serv., 436 U.S. 658 (1978).
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question and had concluded that local governments are liable under
a theory of respondeat superior for their employees' violations of
section 198 I . 13"
On certiorari, a divided Supreme Court agreed with the Fifth
Circuit. ' 3 ' Municipal liability can no longer be predicated on respon-
deat superior in an action under section 1981. 1 " It will be the plain-
tiff's burden in actions against governmental entities to establish
not only the substantive claim of intentional discrimination, but also
that the official engaging in the discrimination was either invested
with policymaking authority by the locality (so that the official's
conduct can be said to represent municipal policy)'" or acted pur-
suant to a longstanding practice or custom of the local government.
Section 1981 thus emerges from the 1988 Supreme Court Term
like a patient who is ordered to undergo surgery, being advised that
she probably will not survive the procedure. To her delight, she
awakens alive in the recovery room, but then finds that all her limbs
have been amputated. As a remedy against discrimination in both
00 See cases cited at 109 S. Ct. at 2709.
"I The dissenters wrote that
To anyone familiar with this and last Terms debate over whether [Runyon]
should be overruled, see !Patterson], today's decision can be nothing short of
astonishing. After being led to believe that the hard question under 42 U.S.C.
1981 ... was whether the statute created a cause of action relating to private
conduct, today we are told that the hard question is, in fact, whether it creates
such an action on the basis of governmental conduct. Strange indeed, simulta-
neously to question whether § 1981 creates a cause of action on the basis of
private conduct (Patterson) and whether it creates one for governmental conduct
(this case)—hence to raise the possibility that this landmark civil-rights statute
affords no civil redress at all.
Id. at 2724 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
"2 See id. at 2723. The Court ruled that section 1983 afforded the only available cause
of action against governmental discrimination, and that section 1981 actions must be brought
through the vehicle of a section 1983 action.
03 The Court instructed that this is a question of state law, to be resolved by the judge
before the case is submitted to the jury. Id.
In another governmental liability decision of significance for future civil rights litigation.
the Court held that neither states nor state officials (acting in their official capacity) are
"persons" within the meaning of § 1983. Will v. Michigan Dept of State Police, 109 S. Ct.
2304, 2312 (1989). Will was a state trooper who sued in state court claiming he had been
denied a promotion because of his brother's political activities. He named as defendants the
Department and the Director of State Police in his official capacity. Resolving a conflict in
the decisional law on this point, the Court held that neither defendant was subject to a
damage action under § 1983. Id. at 2311. Thus, litigants who seek a remedy against a state
for the deprivation of civil liberties can no longer use that statute. The Court added the
caveat that actions seeking injunctive relief, and not damages, may proceed against state
officials in their official capacity.
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public and private employment, 42 U.S.C. section 1981 is not the
statute it used to be.
VI. CONCLUSION
Justice Kennedy, writing for the Court in Patterson, concluded:
[T]he law now reflects society's consensus that dis-
crimination based on the color of one's skin is a profound
wrong of tragic dimension. Neither our words nor our
decisions should be interpreted as signaling one inch of
retreat from Congress' policy to forbid discrimination in
the private, as well as public, sphere. k39
There is considerable cause for scepticism regarding this noble
pronouncement. The 1988 Term's decisions have made it signifi-
cantly harder to establish liability under Title VII, and significantly
easier to defend against such actions. Impact theory, which had
proved an invaluable tool in bringing excluded groups into the
workplace, has clearly lost its cutting edge. The scope of section
1981's prohibition, as well as its applicability to governmental con-
duct, have been substantially narrowed. Those governmental enti-
ties inclined to engage in voluntary affirmative efforts to increase
opportunities for minorities now must exhaust race-neutral alter-
natives, document a record of specific discrimination, and narrowly
confine their efforts to undoing the present effects of that discrim-
ination. Perhaps most important, abandonment of the impermissi-
ble collateral attack doctrine has dramatically undercut the integrity
and enforcibility of federal remedial decrees.
The structure for enforcement of civil rights legislation that
has been dismantled during the 1988 Term was not the product of
the "liberal" and controversial Warren Court, but rather of the
"conservative" Burger Court. By the 1985 Term, that Court already
consisted of seven justices appointed by Republican presidents;' 35
yet, Griggs's disparate impact theory, a broad interpretation of sec-
tion 1981, and affirmative race-conscious relief were all intact. The
established doctrine uprooted last Term had been, in short, planted
and nurtured by a majority of Justices not known for their pro-
gressive leanings. They joined, however, in recognizing the com-
' 34 109 S. Ct. at 2379.
"5 Burger, Blackmun, Powell and Rehnquist were appointed by President Nixon; Stevens
by President Ford; O'Connor by President Reagan; and Brennan by President Eisenhower,
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pelling necessity for finally resolving what Gunnar Myrdal long ago
identified as the most persistent of American tragedies: racism.'"
The post-Civil War period witnessed the federal government's
effort to protect the newly freed slaves and integrate them into
American society. This first Reconstruction was, however, aban-
doned after 10 years, and blacks were subjected to brutal and op-
pressive treatment at the hands of state and local authorities as well
as terrorist groups like the Ku Klux Klan.'" Another Reconstruc-
tion occurred in the mid-1960s, with the enactment and revival of
federal legislation -designed to assure minorities and women equal
opportunity and a place in the American economic mainstream.
Unfortunately, last 'Term's decisions spell a judicial abandonment-
of that second Reconstruction. This comes at a time when the
economic gap between white and non-white Americans is widen-
ing.'"
Once again the fate of the Nation's disadvantaged has been cast
to the winds.
136 See G. MYRDAL, AN AMERICAN DILEMMA (1944).
I" See generally D. BELL. supra note 112, at 30-38 (& citations therein); E. FONER,
RECONSTRUCTION: AMERICA'S UNFINISHED REVOLUTION 1863-1877 (1988).
199
	 REPORT OF THE NATIONAL URBAN LEAGUE, reported in Boston Globe, Jan. 29,
1989, at A19. Black per capita income, as a percentage of white income, is declining. Black
poverty is up, while white poverty is down. Black unemployment remains twice that of white.
